Modern versions of macOS use a file system permission model that’s far more complex than the traditional BSD rwx model, and this post is my attempt at explaining that model. If you have a question about this, post it here on DevForums. Put your thread in the App & System Services > Core OS topic area and tag it with Files and Storage.
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—
Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple
let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
On File System Permissions
Modern versions of macOS have five different file system permission mechanisms:
Traditional BSD permissions
Access control lists (ACLs)
App Sandbox
Mandatory access control (MAC)
Endpoint Security (ES)
The first two were introduced a long time ago and rarely trip folks up. The second two are newer, more complex, and specific to macOS, and thus are the source of some confusion. Finally, Endpoint Security allows third-party developers to deny file system operations based on their own criteria. This post offers explanations and advice about all of these mechanisms.
Error Codes
App Sandbox and the mandatory access control system are both implemented using macOS’s sandboxing infrastructure. When a file system operation fails, check the error to see whether it was blocked by this sandboxing infrastructure. If an operation was blocked by BSD permissions or ACLs, it fails with EACCES (Permission denied, 13). If it was blocked by something else, it’ll fail with EPERM (Operation not permitted, 1).
If you’re using Foundation’s FileManager, these error are both reported as Foundation errors, for example, the NSFileReadNoPermissionError error. To recover the underlying error, get the NSUnderlyingErrorKey property from the info dictionary.
App Sandbox
File system access within the App Sandbox is controlled by two factors. The first is the entitlements on the main executable. There are three relevant groups of entitlements:
The com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement enables the App Sandbox. This denies access to all file system locations except those on a built-in allowlist (things like /System) or within the app’s containers.
The various “standard location” entitlements extend the sandbox to include their corresponding locations.
The various “file access temporary exceptions” entitlements extend the sandbox to include the items listed in the entitlement.
Collectively this is known as your static sandbox.
The second factor is dynamic sandbox extensions. The system issues these extensions to your sandbox based on user behaviour. For example, if the user selects a file in the open panel, the system issues a sandbox extension to your process so that it can access that file. The type of extension is determined by the main executable’s entitlements:
com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only results in an extension that grants read-only access.
com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write results in an extension that grants read/write access.
Note There’s currently no way to get a dynamic sandbox extension that grants executable access. For all the gory details, see this post.
These dynamic sandbox extensions are tied to your process; they go away when your process terminates. To maintain persistent access to an item, use a security-scoped bookmark. See Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox. To pass access between processes, use an implicit security scoped bookmark, that is, a bookmark that was created without an explicit security scope (no .withSecurityScope flag) and without disabling the implicit security scope (no .withoutImplicitSecurityScope flag)).
If you have access to a directory — regardless of whether that’s via an entitlement or a dynamic sandbox extension — then, in general, you have access to all items in the hierarchy rooted at that directory. This does not overrule the MAC protection discussed below. For example, if the user grants you access to ~/Library, that does not give you access to ~/Library/Mail because the latter is protected by MAC.
Finally, the discussion above is focused on a new sandbox, the thing you get when you launch a sandboxed app from the Finder. If a sandboxed process starts a child process, that child process inherits its sandbox from its parent. For information on what happens in that case, see the Note box in Enabling App Sandbox Inheritance.
IMPORTANT The child process inherits its parent process’s sandbox regardless of whether it has the com.apple.security.inherit entitlement. That entitlement exists primarily to act as a marker for App Review. App Review requires that all main executables have the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement, and that entitlements starts a new sandbox by default. Thus, any helper tool inside your app needs the com.apple.security.inherit entitlement to trigger inheritance. However, if you’re not shipping on the Mac App Store you can leave off both of these entitlement and the helper process will inherit its parent’s sandbox just fine. The same applies if you run a built-in executable, like /bin/sh, as a child process.
When the App Sandbox blocks something, it might generates a sandbox violation report. For information on how to view these reports, see Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations.
To learn more about the App Sandbox, see the various links in App Sandbox Resources. For information about how to embed a helper tool in a sandboxed app, see Embedding a Command-Line Tool in a Sandboxed App.
Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control (MAC) has been a feature of macOS for many releases, but it’s become a lot more prominent since macOS 10.14. There are many flavours of MAC but the ones you’re most likely to encounter are:
Full Disk Access (macOS 10.14 and later)
Files and Folders (macOS 10.15 and later)
App bundle protection (macOS 13 and later)
App container protection (macOS 14 and later)
App group container protection (macOS 15 and later)
Data Vaults (see below) and other internal techniques used by various macOS subsystems
The exact list of file system locations protected by MAC is not documented and, as illustrated by the list above, can change over time.
If your process runs into a MAC check the system might prompt the user to grant the process access, or it might just fail the access. If the user grants the process access, the system might only grant that access for this specific process, or it might persist that access for the program that this process is running. The exact behaviour varies based on the specific location in the file system and can also vary between different versions of macOS.
Mandatory access control, as the name suggests, is mandatory; it’s not an opt-in like the App Sandbox. Rather, all processes on the system, including those running as root, as subject to MAC.
Data Vaults are not a third-party developer opportunity. See this post if you’re curious.
In the Full Disk Access and Files and Folders cases, users grant a program a MAC privilege using System Settings > Privacy & Security. Some MAC privileges are per user (Files and Folders) and some are system wide (Full Disk Access). If you’re not sure, run this simple test:
On a Mac with two users, log in as user A and enable the MAC privilege for a program.
Now log in as user B. Does the program have the privilege?
If a process tries to access an item restricted by MAC, the system may prompt the user to grant it access there and then. For example, if an app tries to access the desktop, you’ll see an alert like this:
“AAA” would like to access files in your Desktop folder.
[Don’t Allow] [OK]
To customise this message, set Files and Folders properties in your Info.plist.
This system only displays this alert once. It remembers the user’s initial choice and returns the same result thereafter. This relies on your code having a stable code signing identity. If your code is unsigned, or signed ad hoc (Signed to Run Locally in Xcode parlance), the system can’t tell that version N+1 of your code is the same as version N, and thus you’ll encounter excessive prompts.
Note For information about how that works, see TN3127 Inside Code Signing: Requirements.
The Files and Folders prompts only show up if the process is running in a GUI login session. If not, the operation is allowed or denied based on existing information. If there’s no existing information, the operation is denied by default.
For more information about app and app group container protection, see the links in Trusted Execution Resources. For more information about app groups in general, see App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony
On managed systems the site admin can use the com.apple.TCC.configuration-profile-policy payload to assign MAC privileges.
For testing purposes you can reset parts of TCC using the tccutil command-line tool. For general information about that tool, see its man page. For a list of TCC service names, see the posts on this thread.
Note TCC stands for transparency, consent, and control. It’s the subsystem within macOS that manages most of the privileges visible in System Settings > Privacy & Security. TCC has no API surface, but you see its name in various places, including the above-mentioned configuration profile payload and command-line tool, and the name of its accompanying daemon, tccd.
While tccutil is an easy way to do basic TCC testing, the most reliable way to test TCC is in a VM, restoring to a fresh snapshot between each test. If you want to try this out, crib ideas from Testing a Notarised Product.
The MAC privilege mechanism is heavily dependent on the concept of responsible code. For example, if an app contains a helper tool and the helper tool triggers a MAC prompt, we want:
The app’s name and usage description to appear in the alert.
The user’s decision to be recorded for the whole app, not that specific helper tool.
That decision to show up in System Settings under the app’s name.
For this to work the system must be able to tell that the app is the responsible code for the helper tool. The system has various heuristics to determine this and it works reasonably well in most cases. However, it’s possible to break this link. I haven’t fully research this but my experience is that this most often breaks when the child process does something ‘odd’ to break the link, such as trying to daemonise itself.
If you’re building a launchd daemon or agent and you find that it’s not correctly attributed to your app, add the AssociatedBundleIdentifiers property to your launchd property list. See the launchd.plist man page for the details.
Scripting
MAC presents some serious challenges for scripting because scripts are run by interpreters and the system can’t distinguish file system operations done by the interpreter from those done by the script. For example, if you have a script that needs to manipulate files on your desktop, you wouldn’t want to give the interpreter that privilege because then any script could do that.
The easiest solution to this problem is to package your script as a standalone program that MAC can use for its tracking. This may be easy or hard depending on the specific scripting environment. For example, AppleScript makes it easy to export a script as a signed app, but that’s not true for shell scripts.
TCC and Main Executables
TCC expects its bundled clients — apps, app extensions, and so on — to use a native main executable. That is, it expects the CFBundleExecutable property to be the name of a Mach-O executable. If your product uses a script as its main executable, you’re likely to encounter TCC problems. To resolve these, switch to using a Mach-O executable. For an example of how you might do that, see this post.
Endpoint Security
Endpoint Security (ES) is a general mechanism for third-party products to enforce custom security policies on the Mac. An ES client asks ES to send it events when specific security-relevant operations occur. These events can be notifications or authorisations. In the case of authorisation events, the ES client must either allow or deny the operation.
As you might imagine, the set of security-relevant operations includes file system operations. For example, when you open a file using the open system call, ES delivers the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN event to any interested ES clients. If one of those ES client denies the operation, the open system call fails with EPERM.
For more information about ES, see the Endpoint Security framework documentation.
Originally ES clients operated system wide. macOS 27 introduced a new mechanism, es_new_descendants_client, that allows an ES client to operate on the process hierarchy rooted at the client itself.
Revision History
2026-09-18 Extended the Endpoint Security section to discuss es_new_descendants_client. Clarified the scope of MAC.
2025-11-04 Added a discussion of Endpoint Security. Made numerous minor editorial changes.
2024-11-08 Added info about app group container protection. Clarified that Data Vaults are just one example of the techniques used internally by macOS. Made other editorial changes.
2023-06-13 Replaced two obsolete links with links to shiny new official documentation: Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox and Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations. Added a short discussion of app container protection and a link to WWDC 2023 Session 10053 What’s new in privacy.
2023-04-07 Added a link to my post about executable permissions. Fixed a broken link.
2023-02-10 In TCC and Main Executables, added a link to my native trampoline code. Introduced the concept of an implicit security scoped bookmark. Introduced AssociatedBundleIdentifiers. Made other minor editorial changes.
2022-04-26 Added an explanation of the TCC initialism. Added a link to Viewing Sandbox Violation Reports. Added the TCC and Main Executables section. Made significant editorial changes.
2022-01-10 Added a discussion of the file system hierarchy.
2021-04-26 First posted.