Hi, I’m currently implementing App Attest attestation validation on the development server. However, I’m receiving a 403 Forbidden response when I POST a CBOR-encoded payload to the following endpoint: curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/cbor" --data-binary @payload.cbor 'https://data-development.appattest.apple.com' Here’s how I’m generating the CBOR payload in Java: Map<String, Object> payload = new HashMap<>(); payload.put("attestation", attestationBytes); // byte[] from DCAppAttestService payload.put("clientDataHash", clientDataHash); // SHA-256 hash of the challenge (byte[]) payload.put("keyId", keyIdBytes); // Base64-decoded keyId (byte[]) payload.put("appId", TEAM_ID + "." + BUNDLE_ID); // e.g., "ABCDE12345.com.example.app" ObjectMapper cborMapper = new ObjectMapper(new CBORFactory()); byte[] cborBody = cborMapper.writeValueAsBytes(payload); I’m unsure whether the endpoint is rejecting the payload format or if the endpoint itself is incorrect for this stage. I’d appreciate clarification on the following: 1. Is https://data-development.appattest.apple.com the correct endpoint for key attestation in a development environment? 2. Should this endpoint accept CBOR-encoded payloads, or is it only for JSON-based assertion validation? 3. Is there a current official Apple documentation that lists: • the correct URLs for key attestation and assertion validation (production and development), • or any server-side example code (e.g., Java, Python) for handling attestation/validation on the backend? So far, I couldn’t find an official document that explicitly describes the expected HTTP endpoints for these operations. If there’s a newer guide or updated API reference, I’d appreciate a link. Thanks in advance for your help.

Hello, sorry for the awkward text formatting but I kept getting prevented from positing due to "sensitive language"... Help.txt

Estou compartilhando algumas observações técnicas sobre Crash Detection / Emergency SOS no ecossistema Apple, com base em eventos amplamente observados em 2022 e 2024, quando houve chamadas automáticas em massa para serviços de emergência. A ideia aqui não é discutir UX superficial ou “edge cases isolados”, mas sim comportamento sistêmico em escala, algo que acredito ser relevante para qualquer time que trabalhe com sistemas críticos orientados a eventos físicos. Contexto resumido A partir do iPhone 14, a Detecção de Acidente passou a correlacionar múltiplos sensores (acelerômetros de alta faixa, giroscópio, GPS, microfones) para inferir eventos de impacto severo e acionar automaticamente chamadas de emergência. Em 2022, isso resultou em um volume significativo de falsos positivos, especialmente em atividades com alta aceleração (esqui, snowboard, parques de diversão). Em 2024, apesar de ajustes, houve recorrência localizada do mesmo padrão. Ponto técnico central O problema não parece ser hardware, nem um “bug pontual”, mas sim o estado intermediário de decisão: Aceleração ≠ acidente Ruído ≠ impacto real Movimento extremo ≠ incapacidade humana Quando o classificador entra em estado ambíguo, o sistema depende de uma janela curta de confirmação humana (toque/voz). Em ambientes ruidosos, com o usuário em movimento ou fisicamente ativo, essa confirmação frequentemente falha. O sistema então assume incapacidade e executa a ação fail-safe: chamada automática. Do ponto de vista de engenharia de segurança, isso é compreensível. Do ponto de vista de escala, é explosivo. Papel da Siri A Siri não “decide” o acidente, mas é um elo sensível na cadeia humano–máquina. Falhas de compreensão por ruído, idioma, respiração ofegante ou ausência de resposta acabam sendo interpretadas como sinal de emergência real. Isso é funcionalmente equivalente ao que vemos em sistemas automotivos como o eCall europeu, quando a confirmação humana é inexistente ou degradada. O dilema estrutural Há um trade-off claro e inevitável: Reduzir falsos negativos (não perder um acidente real) Aumentar falsos positivos (chamadas indevidas) Para o usuário individual, errar “para mais” faz sentido. Para serviços públicos de emergência, milhões de dispositivos errando “para mais” criam ruído operacional real. Por que isso importa para developers A Apple hoje opera, na prática, um dos maiores sistemas privados de segurança pessoal automatizada do mundo, interagindo diretamente com infraestrutura pública crítica. Isso coloca Crash Detection / SOS na mesma categoria de sistemas safety-critical, onde: UX é parte da segurança Algoritmos precisam ser auditáveis “Human-in-the-loop” não pode ser apenas nominal Reflexões abertas Alguns pontos que, como developer, acho que merecem discussão: Janelas de confirmação humana adaptativas ao contexto (atividade física, ruído). Cancelamento visual mais agressivo em cenários de alto movimento. Perfis de sensibilidade por tipo de atividade, claramente comunicados. Critérios adicionais antes da chamada automática quando o risco de falso positivo é estatisticamente alto. Não é um problema simples, nem exclusivo da Apple. É um problema de software crítico em contato direto com o mundo físico, operando em escala planetária. Justamente por isso, acho que vale uma discussão técnica aberta, sem ruído emocional. Curioso para ouvir perspectivas de quem trabalha com sistemas similares (automotivo, wearables, safety-critical, ML embarcado). — Rafa

Hello, When using ASWebAuthenticationSession with an HTTPS callback URL (Universal Link), I receive the following error: Authorization error: The operation couldn't be completed. Application with identifier jp.xxxx.yyyy.dev is not associated with domain xxxx-example.go.link. Using HTTPS callbacks requires Associated Domains using the webcredentials service type for xxxx-example.go.link. I checked Apple’s official documentation but couldn’t find any clear statement that webcredentials is required when using HTTPS callbacks in ASWebAuthenticationSession. What I’d like to confirm: Is webcredentials officially required when using HTTPS as a callback URL with ASWebAuthenticationSession? If so, is there any official documentation or technical note that states this requirement? Environment iOS 18.6.2 Xcode 16.4 Any clarification or official references would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

I regularly see folks confused by the difference in behaviour of app groups between macOS and iOS. There have been substantial changes in this space recently. While much of this is now covered in the official docs (r. 92322409), I’ve updated this post to go into all the gory details. If you have questions or comments, start a new thread with the details. Put it in the App & System Services > Core OS topic area and tag it with Code Signing and Entitlements. Oh, and if your question is about app group containers, also include Files and Storage. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony There are two styles of app group ID: iOS-style app group IDs start with group., for example, group.eskimo1.test. macOS-style app group IDs start with your Team ID, for example, SKMME9E2Y8.eskimo1.test. This difference has been the source of numerous weird problems over the years. Starting in Feb 2025, iOS-style app group IDs are fully supported on macOS for all product types [1]. If you’re writing new code that uses app groups, use an iOS-style app group ID. If you have existing code that uses a macOS-style app group ID, consider how you might transition to the iOS style. IMPORTANT The Feb 2025 changes aren’t tied to an OS release but rather to a Developer website update. For more on this, see Feb 2025 Changes, below. [1] If your product is a standalone executable, like a daemon or agent, wrap it in an app-like structure, as explained in Signing a daemon with a restricted entitlement. iOS-Style App Group IDs An iOS-style app group ID has the following features: It starts with the group. prefix, for example, group.eskimo1.test. You allocate it on the Developer website. This assigns the app group ID to your team. You then claim access to it by listing it in the App Groups entitlement (com.apple.security.application-groups) entitlement. That claim must be authorised by a provisioning profile [1]. The Developer website will only let you include your team’s app group IDs in your profile. For more background on provisioning profiles, see TN3125 Inside Code Signing: Provisioning Profiles. iOS-style app group IDs originated on iOS with iOS 3.0. They’ve always been supported on iOS’s child platforms (iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, and watchOS). On the Mac: They’ve been supported by Mac Catalyst since that technology was introduced. Likewise for iOS Apps on Mac. Starting in Feb 2025, they’re supported for other Mac products. [1] Strictly speaking macOS does not require that, but if your claim is not authorised by a profile then you might run into other problems. See Entitlements-Validated Flag, below. macOS-Style App Group IDs A macOS-style app group ID has the following features: It should start with your Team ID [1], for example, SKMME9E2Y8.eskimo1.test. It can’t be explicitly allocated on the Developer website. Code that isn’t sandboxed doesn’t need to claim the app group ID in the App Groups entitlement. [2] To use an app group, claim the app group ID in the App Groups entitlement. The App Groups entitlement is not restricted on macOS, meaning that this claim doesn’t need to be authorised by a provisioning profile [3]. However, if you claim an app group ID that’s not authorised in some way, you might run into problems. More on that later in this post. If you submit an app to the Mac App Store, the submission process checks that your app group IDs make sense, that is, they either start with your Team ID (macOS style) or are assigned to your team (iOS style). [1] This is “should” because, historically, macOS has not actually required it. However, that’s now changing, with things like app group container protection. [2] This was true prior to macOS 15. It may still technically be true in macOS 15 and later, but the most important thing, access to the app group container, requires the entitlement because of app group container protection. [3] Technically it’s a validation-required entitlement, something that we’ll come back to in the Entitlements-Validated Flag section. Feb 2025 Changes On 21 Feb 2025 we rolled out a change to the Developer website that completes the support for iOS-style app group IDs on the Mac. Specifically, it’s now possible to create a Mac provisioning profile that authorises the use of an iOS-style app group ID. Note This change doesn’t affect Mac Catalyst or iOS Apps on Mac, which have always been able to use iOS-style app group IDs on the Mac. Prior to this change it was possible to use an iOS-style app group ID on the Mac but that might result in some weird behaviour. Later sections of this post describe some of those problems. Of course, that information is now only of historical interest because, if you’re using an iOS-style app group, you can and should authorise that use with a provisioning profile. We also started seeding Xcode 16.3, which has since been release. This is aware of the Developer website change, and its Signing & Capabilities editor actively encourages you to use iOS-style app groups IDs in all products. Note This Xcode behaviour is the only option for iOS and its child platforms. With Xcode 16.3, it’s now the default for macOS as well. If you have existing project, enable this behaviour using the Register App Groups build setting. Finally, we updated a number of app group documentation pages, including App Groups entitlement and Configuring app groups. Crossing the Streams In some circumstances you might need to have a single app that accesses both an iOS- and a macOS-style app group. For example: You have a macOS app. You want to migrate to an iOS-style app group ID, perhaps because you want to share an app group container with a Mac Catalyst app. But you also need to access existing content in a container identified by a macOS-style app group ID. Historically this caused problems (FB16664827) but, as of Jun 2025, this is fully supported (r. 148552377). When the Developer website generates a Mac provisioning profile for an App ID with the App Groups capability, it automatically adds TEAM_ID.* to the list of app group IDs authorised by that profile (where TEAM_ID is your Team ID). This allows the app to claim access to every iOS-style app group ID associated with the App ID and any macOS-style app group IDs for that team. This helps in two circumstances: It avoids any Mac App Store Connect submission problems, because App Store Connect can see that the app’s profile authorises its use of all the it app group IDs it claims access to. Outside of App Store — for example, when you directly distribute an app using Developer ID signing — you no longer have to rely on macOS granting implicit access to macOS-style app group IDs. Rather, such access is explicitly authorised by your profile. That ensures that your entitlements remain validated, as discussed in the Entitlements-Validated Flag, below. A Historical Interlude These different styles of app group IDs have historical roots: On iOS, third-party apps have always used provisioning profiles, and thus the App Groups entitlement is restricted just like any other entitlement. On macOS, support for app groups was introduced before macOS had general support for provisioning profiles [1], and thus the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted. The unrestricted nature of this entitlement poses two problems. The first is accidental collisions. How do you prevent folks from accidentally using an app group ID that’s in use by some other developer? On iOS this is easy: The Developer website assigns each app group ID to a specific team, which guarantees uniqueness. macOS achieved a similar result by using the Team ID as a prefix. The second problem is malicious reuse. How do you prevent a Mac app from accessing the app group containers of some other team? Again, this isn’t an issue on iOS because the App Groups entitlement is restricted. On macOS the solution was for the Mac App Store to prevent you from publishing an app that used an app group ID that’s used by another team. However, this only works for Mac App Store apps. Directly distributed apps were free to access app group containers of any other app. That was considered acceptable back when the Mac App Store was first introduced. That’s no longer the case, which is why macOS 15 introduced app group container protection. See App Group Container Protection, below. [1] I’m specifically talking about provisioning profiles for directly distributed apps, that is, apps using Developer ID signing. Entitlements-Validated Flag The fact that the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted on macOS is, when you think about it, a little odd. The purpose of entitlements is to gate access to functionality. If an entitlement isn’t restricted, it’s not much of a gate! For most unrestricted entitlements that’s not a problem. Specifically, for both the App Sandbox and Hardened Runtime entitlements, those are things you opt in to, so macOS is happy to accept the entitlement at face value. After all, if you want to cheat you can just not opt in [1]. However, this isn’t the case for the App Groups entitlement, which actually gates access to functionality. Dealing with this requires macOS to walk a fine line between security and compatibility. Part of that solution is the entitlements-validated flag. When a process runs an executable, macOS checks its entitlements. There are two categories: Restricted entitlements must be authorised by a provisioning profile. If your process runs an executable that claims a restricted entitlement that’s not authorised by a profile, the system traps. Unrestricted entitlements don’t have to be authorised by a provisioning profile; they can be used by any code at any time. However, the App Groups entitlement is a special type of unrestricted entitlement called a validation-required entitlement. If a process runs an executable that claims a validation-required entitlement and that claim is not authorised by a profile, the system allows the process to continue running but clears its entitlements-validated flag. Some subsystems gate functionality on the entitlements-validated flag. For example, the data protection keychain uses entitlements as part of its access control model, but refuses to honour those entitlements if the entitlement-validated flag has been cleared. Note If you’re curious about this flag, use the procinfo subcommand of launchctl to view it. For example: % sudo launchctl procinfo `pgrep Test20230126` … code signing info = valid … entitlements validated … If the flag has been cleared, this line will be missing from the code signing info section. Historically this was a serious problem because it prevented you from creating an app that uses both app groups and the data protection keychain [2] (r. 104859788). Fortunately that’s no longer an issue because the Developer website now lets you include the App Groups entitlement in macOS provisioning profiles. [1] From the perspective of macOS checking entitlements at runtime. There are other checks: The App Sandbox is mandatory for Mac App Store apps, but that’s checked when you upload the app to App Store Connect. Directly distributed apps must be notarised to pass Gatekeeper, and the notary service requires that all executables enable the hardened runtime. [2] See TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations for more about the data protection keychain. App Groups and the Keychain The differences described above explain a historical oddity associated with keychain access. The Sharing access to keychain items among a collection of apps article says: Application groups When you collect related apps into an application group using the App Groups entitlement, they share access to a group container, and gain the ability to message each other in certain ways. You can use app group names as keychain access group names, without adding them to the Keychain Access Groups entitlement. On iOS this makes a lot of sense: The App Groups entitlement is a restricted entitlement on iOS. The Developer website assigns each iOS-style app group ID to a specific team, which guarantees uniqueness. The required group. prefix means that these keychain access groups can’t collide with other keychain access groups, which all start with an App ID prefix (there’s also Apple-only keychain access groups that start with other prefixes, like apple). However, this didn’t work on macOS [1] because the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted there. However, with the Feb 2025 changes it should now be possible to use an iOS-style app group ID as a keychain access group on macOS. Note I say “should” because I’ve not actually tried it (-: Keep in mind that standard keychain access groups are protected the same way on all platforms, using the restricted Keychain Access Groups entitlement (keychain-access-groups). [1] Except for Mac Catalyst apps and iOS Apps on Mac. Not Entirely Unsatisfied When you launch a Mac app that uses app groups you might see this log entry: type: error time: 10:41:35.858009+0000 process: taskgated-helper subsystem: com.apple.ManagedClient category: ProvisioningProfiles message: com.example.apple-samplecode.Test92322409: Unsatisfied entitlements: com.apple.security.application-groups Note The exact format of that log entry, and the circumstances under which it’s generated, varies by platform. On macOS 13.0.1 I was able to generate it by running a sandboxed app that claims a macOS-style app group ID in the App Groups entitlement and also claims some other restricted entitlement. This looks kinda worrying and can be the source of problems. It means that the App Groups entitlement claims an entitlement that’s not authorised by a provisioning profile. On iOS this would trap, but on macOS the system allows the process to continue running. It does, however, clear the entitlements-validate flag. See Entitlements-Validated Flag for an in-depth discussion of this. The easiest way to avoid this problem is to authorise your app group ID claims with a provisioning profile. If there’s some reason you can’t do that, watch out for potential problems with: The data protection keychain — See the discussion of that in the Entitlements-Validated Flag and App Groups and the Keychain sections, both above. App group container protection — See App Group Container Protection, below. App Group Container Protection macOS 15 introduced app group container protection. To access an app group container without user intervention: Claim access to the app group by listing its ID in the App Groups entitlement. Locate the container by calling the containerURL(forSecurityApplicationGroupIdentifier:) method. Ensure that at least one of the following criteria are met: Your app is deployed via the Mac App Store (A). Or via TestFlight when running on macOS 15.1 or later (B). Or the app group ID starts with your app’s Team ID (C). Or your app’s claim to the app group is authorised by a provisioning profile embedded in the app (D) [1]. If your app doesn’t follow these rules, the system prompts the user to approve its access to the container. If granted, that consent applies only for the duration of that app instance. For more on this, see: The System Integrity Protection section of the macOS Sequoia 15 Release Notes The System Integrity Protection section of the macOS Sequoia 15.1 Release Notes WWDC 2024 Session 10123 What’s new in privacy, starting at 12:23 The above criteria mean that you rarely run into the app group authorisation prompt. If you encounter a case where that happens, feel free to start a thread here on DevForums. See the top of this post for info on the topic and tags to use. Note Prior to the Feb 2025 change, things generally worked out fine when you app was deployed but you might’ve run into problems during development. That’s no longer the case. [1] This is what allows Mac Catalyst and iOS Apps on Mac to work. Revision History 2025-08-12 Added a reference to the Register App Groups build setting. 2025-07-28 Updated the Crossing the Streams section for the Jun 2025 change. Made other minor editorial changes. 2025-04-16 Rewrote the document now that iOS-style app group IDs are fully supported on the Mac. Changed the title from App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Fight! to App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony 2025-02-25 Fixed the Xcode version number mentioned in yesterday’s update. 2025-02-24 Added a quick update about the iOS-style app group IDs on macOS issue. 2024-11-05 Further clarified app group container protection. Reworked some other sections to account for this new reality. 2024-10-29 Clarified the points in App Group Container Protection. 2024-10-23 Fleshed out the discussion of app group container protection on macOS 15. 2024-09-04 Added information about app group container protection on macOS 15. 2023-01-31 Renamed the Not Entirely Unsatisfactory section to Not Entirely Unsatisfied. Updated it to describe the real impact of that log message. 2022-12-12 First posted.

Please correct the following issues and upload a new binary to App Store Connect. ITMS-91061: Missing privacy manifest - Your app includes “Frameworks/FirebaseCoreDiagnostics.framework/FirebaseCoreDiagnostics”, which includes FirebaseCoreDiagnostics, an SDK that was identified in the documentation as a commonly used third-party SDK. If a new app includes a commonly used third-party SDK, or an app update adds a new commonly used third-party SDK, the SDK must include a privacy manifest file. Please contact the provider of the SDK that includes this file to get an updated SDK version with a privacy manifest. For more details about this policy, including a list of SDKs that are required to include signatures and manifests, visit: https://developer.apple.com/support/third-party-SDK-requirements. ITMS-91061: Missing privacy manifest - Your app includes “Frameworks/FBLPromises.framework/FBLPromises”, which includes FBLPromises, an SDK that was identified in the documentation as a commonly used third-party SDK. If a new app includes a commonly used third-party SDK, or an app update adds a new commonly used third-party SDK, the SDK must include a privacy manifest file. Please contact the provider of the SDK that includes this file to get an updated SDK version with a privacy manifest. For more details about this policy, including a list of SDKs that are required to include signatures and manifests, visit: https://developer.apple.com/support/third-party-SDK-requirements. ITMS-91061: Missing privacy manifest - Your app includes “Frameworks/GoogleDataTransport.framework/GoogleDataTransport”, which includes GoogleDataTransport, an SDK that was identified in the documentation as a commonly used third-party SDK. If a new app includes a commonly used third-party SDK, or an app update adds a new commonly used third-party SDK, the SDK must include a privacy manifest file. Please contact the provider of the SDK that includes this file to get an updated SDK version with a privacy manifest. For more details about this policy, including a list of SDKs that are required to include signatures and manifests, visit: https://developer.apple.com/support/third-party-SDK-requirements. our app is .NET MAUI app so we already addressed this by adding privacyinfo.xcprivacy privacy manifest under platform/ios/resources but still get flagged for this <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>NSPrivacyTracking</key> <false/> <key>NSPrivacyTrackingDomains</key> <array/> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes</key> <array> <dict> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key> <string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryFileTimestamp</string> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key> <array> <string>C617.1</string> </array> </dict> <dict> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key> <string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategorySystemBootTime</string> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key> <array> <string>35F9.1</string> </array> </dict> <dict> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key> <string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryDiskSpace</string> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key> <array> <string>E174.1</string> </array> </dict> <dict> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key> <string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryUserDefaults</string> <key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key> <array> <string>CA92.1</string> </array> </dict> </array> <key>NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes</key> <array/> </dict> </plist>

We’ve noticed an unexpected behavior in our production iOS app where the UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor value occasionally changes, even though: The app is distributed via the App Store (not TestFlight or Xcode builds) We do not switch provisioning profiles or developer accounts No App Clips, App Thinning, or other advanced features are in use There’s no manual reinstall or device reset in the scenarios observed (as per user feedback) Any insights or confirmations would be much appreciated. Thanks!

Hi everyone, I’m encountering an unexpected Keychain behavior in a production environment and would like to confirm whether this is expected or if I’m missing something. In my app, I store a deviceId in the Keychain based on the classic KeychainItemWrapper implementation. I extended it by explicitly setting: kSecAttrAccessible = kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock My understanding is that kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock should allow Keychain access while the app is running in the background, as long as the device has been unlocked at least once after reboot. However, after the app went live, I observed that when the app performs background execution (e.g., triggered by background tasks / silent push), Keychain read attempts intermittently fail with: errSecInteractionNotAllowed (-25308) This seems inconsistent with the documented behavior of kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock. Additional context: The issue never occurs in foreground. The issue does not appear on development devices. User devices are not freshly rebooted when this happens. The Keychain item is created successfully; only background reads fail. Setting the accessibility to kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly produces the same result. Questions: Under what circumstances can kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock still cause a -25308 error? Is there any known restriction when accessing Keychain while the app is running in background execution contexts? Could certain system states (Low Power Mode, Background App Refresh conditions, device lock state, etc.) cause Keychain reads to be blocked unexpectedly? Any insights or similar experiences would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!

I'm writing an app on macOS that stores passwords in the Keychain and later retrieves them using SecItemCopyMatching(). This works fine 90% of the time. However, occasionally, the call to SecItemCopyMatching() fails with errSecAuthFailed (-25293). When this occurs, simply restarting the app resolves the issue; otherwise, it will consistently fail with errSecAuthFailed. What I suspect is that the Keychain access permission has a time limitation for a process. This issue always seems to arise when I keep my app running for an extended period.

Hi everyone, I’ve been working on storing keys and passwords in the macOS Keychain using the Keychain Services API. Specifically, I’m leveraging SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags to bind items to access control flags, and overall, it’s been working smoothly. I have a question regarding the .applicationPassword flag of SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags. While it successfully prompts the user to input a password, there are no apparent password rules, even a simple “1” is accepted. My questions are: Is there a way to enforce strong password requirements when using the .applicationPassword flag? If enforcing strong passwords isn’t possible, is there an alternative approach to provide a predefined strong password during the creation process, bypassing the need for user input? With SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags, I noticed the item isn’t stored in the traditional file-based Keychain but in an iOS-style Keychain, is there a way to store it in a file-based Keychain while marking it as unexportable? I appreciate any insights or suggestions. Thank you! Neil

Hi, I'm working on developing my own CryptoTokenKit (CTK) extension to enable codesign with HSM-backed keys. Here's what I’ve done so far: The container app sets up the tokenConfiguration with TKTokenKeychainCertificate and TKTokenKeychainKey. The extension registers successfully and is visible via pluginkit when launching the container app. The virtual smartcard appears when running security list-smartcards. The certificate, key, and identity are all visible using security export-smartcard -i [card]. However, nothing appears in the Keychain. After adding logging and reviewing output in the Console, I’ve observed the following behavior when running codesign: My TKTokenSession is instantiated correctly, using my custom TKToken implementation — so far, so good. However, none of the following TKTokenSession methods are ever called: func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, beginAuthFor operation: TKTokenOperation, constraint: Any) throws -> TKTokenAuthOperation func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, supports operation: TKTokenOperation, keyObjectID: TKToken.ObjectID, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) -> Bool func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, sign dataToSign: Data, keyObjectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) throws -> Data func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, decrypt ciphertext: Data, keyObjectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) throws -> Data func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, performKeyExchange otherPartyPublicKeyData: Data, keyObjectID objectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm, parameters: TKTokenKeyExchangeParameters) throws -> Data The only relevant Console log is: default 11:31:15.453969+0200 PersistentToken [0x154d04850] invalidated because the client process (pid 4899) either cancelled the connection or exited There’s no crash report related to the extension, so my assumption is that ctkd is closing the connection for some unknown reason. Is there any way to debug this further? Thank you for your help.

Hi team, is there a native way to detect if a change has been made to biometrics using FaceID or TouchID? Thanks in advance.

Hi, I am creating a custom login window, so I am using SFAuthorizationpluginView, here I want to hide Submit Arrow botton which gets displayed beside username and password text feild , is there a way to hide this, please suggest.

I want iOS device identifier for a framework that is used in multiple vendor's apps. I'm developing a framework to control a peripheral. The framework has to send unique information to register the device with the peripheral. My naive idea was to use IdentifierForVendor. But this API provides the device identifier for the same vendor's apps, not the framework. (The framework will be used by multiple vendors.) Is there a usable device identifier for the framework, regardless of app vendor? Please tell me any solution.

I have a custom NSWindow that I want to exclude from screen capture by setting its sharing state to kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone. The goal is to prevent this window from appearing in the content captured by ScreenCaptureKit. [window setSharingType:NSWindowSharingType::NSWindowSharingNone]; However, on macOS 15.4+ (Sequoia), the window is still captured by ScreenCaptureKit and appears in the shared content. Does anyone know if kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone is still effective with ScreenCaptureKit on macOS 15.4 and later?

While working with Platform SSO on macOS, I’m trying to better understand how the system handles cases where a user’s local account password becomes unsynchronized with their Identity Provider (IdP) password—for example, when the device is offline during a password change. My assumption is that macOS may store some form of persistent token during the Platform SSO user registration process (such as a certificate or similar credential), and that this token could allow the system to unlock the user’s login keychain even if the local password no longer matches the IdP password. I’m hoping to get clarification on the following: Does macOS actually use a persistent token to unlock the login keychain when the local account password is out of sync with the IdP password? If so, how is that mechanism designed to work? If such a capability exists, is it something developers can leverage to enable a true passwordless authentication experience at the login window and lock screen (i.e., avoiding the need for a local password fallback)? I’m trying to confirm what macOS officially supports so I can understand whether passwordless login is achievable using the persistent-token approach. Thanks in advance for any clarification.

I'm seeing some odd behavior which may be a bug. I've broken it down to a least common denominator to reproduce it. But maybe I'm doing something wrong. I am opening a file read-write. I'm then mapping the file read-only and private: void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); I then unmap the memory and close the file. After the close, eslogger shows me this: {"close":{"modified":false,[...],"was_mapped_writable":false}} Which makes sense. I then change the mmap statement to: void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); I run the new code and and the close looks like: {"close":{"modified":false, [....], "was_mapped_writable":true}} Which also makes sense. I then run the original again (ie, with MAP_PRIVATE vs. MAP_SHARED) and the close looks like: {"close":{"modified":false,"was_mapped_writable":true,[...]} Which doesn't appear to be correct. Now if I just open and close the file (again, read-write) and don't mmap anything the close still shows: {"close":{ [...], "was_mapped_writable":true,"modified":false}} And the same is true if I open the file read-only. It will remain that way until I delete the file. If I recreate the file and try again, everything is good until I map it MAP_SHARED. I tried this with macOS 13.6.7 and macOS 15.0.1.

I have 2 basic questions related to Launch Constraints: [Q1] Are Launch Constraints supposed to work when SIP is disabled? From what I'm observing, when SIP is disabled, Launch Constraints (e.g. Launch Constraint Parent Process) are not enforced. I can understand that. But it's a bit confusing considering that the stack diagram in the WWDC 2023 session is placing the 'Environment Constraints' block under SIP, not above. Also the documentation only mentions SIP for the 'is-sip-protected' fact. [Q2] Is the SpawnConstraint key in legacy launchd plist files (i.e. inside /Library/Launch(Agents|Daemons)) officially supported? From what I'm seeing, it seems to be working when SIP is enabled. But the WWDC session and the documentation don't really talk about this case.

We are experiencing a significant issue with macOS security alerts that began on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. This alert is incorrectly identifying output files from our snippet tests as malware, causing these files to be blocked and moved to the Trash. This is completely disrupting our automated testing workflows. Issue Description: Alert: We are seeing the "Malware Blocked and Moved to Trash" popup window. Affected Files: The security alert triggers when attempting to execute .par files generated as outputs from our snippet tests. These .par files are unique to each individual test run; they are not a single, static tool. System-Wide Impact: This issue is impacting multiple macOS hosts across our testing infrastructure. Timeline: The issue began abruptly on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. Before that time, our tests were functioning correctly. macOS Versions: The problem is occurring on hosts running both macOS 14.x and 15.x. Experimental Host: Even after upgrading an experimental host to macOS 15.6 beta 2, the issue persisted. Local execution: The issue can be reproduced locally. Observations: The security system is consistently flagging these snippet test output files as malware. Since each test generates a new .par file, and this issue is impacting all generated files, the root cause doesn't appear to be specific to the code within the .par files themselves. This issue is impacting all the snippet tests, making us believe that the root cause is not related to our code. The sudden and widespread nature of the issue strongly suggests a change in a security database or rule, rather than a change in our testing code. Questions: Could a recent update to the XProtect database be the cause of this false positive? Are there any known issues or recent changes in macOS security mechanisms that could cause this kind of widespread and sudden impact? What is the recommended way to diagnose and resolve this kind of false positive? We appreciate any guidance or assistance you can provide. Thank you.

Hi, when creating a CryptoTokenKit extension according to https://developer.apple.com/documentation/cryptotokenkit/authenticating-users-with-a-cryptographic-token, it is neccessary to register it under the securityagent in order to make the CTK usable before login. i.e. we want to run sudo -u _securityagent /Applications/HostApp.app/Contents/MacOS/HostApp However, even with the empty application the command fails with illegal hardware instruction sudo -u _securityagent /Applications/HostApp.app/Contents/MacOS/HostApp I see that it always crashes when the HostApp is sandboxed, but it does not work even without sandboxing (i am sharing the error report message below). i actually noticed that when the HostApp is sandboxed and I run the above command, the extension starts to be usable even before login, even though i see the HostApp crash. The same does not happen without the sandbox So I am curious how to in fact properly register the CTK extension under security agent? Also am not sure how to unregister it from the _securityagent thank you for your help Version: 1.0 (1) Code Type: X86-64 (Native) Parent Process: Exited process [9395] Responsible: Terminal [399] User ID: 92 Date/Time: 2025-03-21 18:54:03.0684 +0100 OS Version: macOS 15.3.2 (24D81) Report Version: 12 Bridge OS Version: 9.3 (22P3060) Anonymous UUID: 41F9918C-5BCA-01C7-59C2-3E8CFC3F8653 Sleep/Wake UUID: 8AB66C75-3C32-41D4-9BD4-887B0FB468FE Time Awake Since Boot: 4300 seconds Time Since Wake: 1369 seconds System Integrity Protection: enabled Crashed Thread: 0 Dispatch queue: WMClientWindowManager Exception Type: EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION (SIGILL) Exception Codes: 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000000000 Termination Reason: Namespace SIGNAL, Code 4 Illegal instruction: 4 Terminating Process: exc handler [9396] Application Specific Signatures: API Misuse Thread 0 Crashed:: Dispatch queue: WMClientWindowManager 0 libxpc.dylib 0x7ff80667b2bd _xpc_api_misuse + 113 1 libxpc.dylib 0x7ff80665f0e4 xpc_connection_set_target_uid + 187 2 WindowManagement 0x7ffd0b946693 -[WMClientWindowManager _createXPCConnection] + 1011 3 WindowManagement 0x7ffd0b947361 -[WMClientWindowManager _xpcConnection] + 65 4 WindowManagement 0x7ffd0b9447c9 __31-[WMClientWindowManager stages]_block_invoke + 41 5 libdispatch.dylib 0x7ff8067af7e2 _dispatch_client_callout + 8 6 libdispatch.dylib 0x7ff8067bca2c _dispatch_lane_barrier_sync_invoke_and_complete + 60 7 WindowManagement 0x7ffd0b9446fc -[WMClientWindowManager stages] + 268 8 AppKit 0x7ff80b1fd0b7 __54-[NSWMWindowCoordinator initializeStageFramesIfNeeded]_block_invoke + 30 9 libdispatch.dylib 0x7ff8067af7e2 _dispatch_client_callout + 8 10 libdispatch.dylib 0x7ff8067b0aa2 _dispatch_once_callout + 20 11 AppKit 0x7ff80b1fd060 -[NSWMWindowCoordinator initializeStageFramesIfNeeded] + 296 12 AppKit 0x7ff80a3b3701 -[NSWindow _commonInitFrame:styleMask:backing:defer:] + 888 13 AppKit 0x7ff80a3b2f77 -[NSWindow _initContent:styleMask:backing:defer:contentView:] + 1222 14 AppKit 0x7ff80a3b2aa9 -[NSWindow initWithContentRect:styleMask:backing:defer:] + 42 15 SwiftUI 0x7ff917f321e0 0x7ff91776f000 + 8139232 16 SwiftUI 0x7ff917a8e2f2 0x7ff91776f000 + 3273458 17 SwiftUI 0x7ff917bccfba 0x7ff91776f000 + 4579258 18 SwiftUI 0x7ff917f2ca8e 0x7ff91776f000 + 8116878 19 SwiftUI 0x7ff917f24a65 0x7ff91776f000 + 8084069 20 SwiftUI 0x7ff917f21540 0x7ff91776f000 + 8070464 21 SwiftUI 0x7ff91849e9f1 0x7ff91776f000 + 13826545 22 SwiftUICore 0x7ffb13103ea5 0x7ffb12c81000 + 4730533 23 SwiftUICore 0x7ffb13102e0f 0x7ffb12c81000 + 4726287 24 SwiftUI 0x7ff91849e903 0x7ff91776f000 + 13826307 25 SwiftUI 0x7ff91849bc1c 0x7ff91776f000 + 13814812 26 AppKit 0x7ff80a54f191 -[NSApplication _doOpenUntitled] + 422 27 AppKit 0x7ff80a4efc59 __58-[NSApplication(NSAppleEventHandling) _handleAEOpenEvent:]_block_invoke + 237 28 AppKit 0x7ff80a963818 __102-[NSApplication _reopenWindowsAsNecessaryIncludingRestorableState:withFullFidelity:completionHandler:]_block_invoke + 101 29 AppKit 0x7ff80a4ef6fa __97-[NSDocumentController(NSInternal) _autoreopenDocumentsIgnoringExpendable:withCompletionHandler:]_block_invoke_3 + 148 30 AppKit 0x7ff80a4eee8f -[NSDocumentController(NSInternal) _autoreopenDocumentsIgnoringExpendable:withCompletionHandler:] + 635 31 AppKit 0x7ff80a96373d -[NSApplication _reopenWindowsAsNecessaryIncludingRestorableState:withFullFidelity:completionHandler:] + 269 32 AppKit 0x7ff80a3a6259 -[NSApplication(NSAppleEventHandling) _handleAEOpenEvent:] + 529 33 AppKit 0x7ff80a3a5eb9 -[NSApplication(NSAppleEventHandling) _handleCoreEvent:withReplyEvent:] + 679 34 Foundation 0x7ff807a4b471 -[NSAppleEventManager dispatchRawAppleEvent:withRawReply:handlerRefCon:] + 307 35 Foundation 0x7ff807a4b285 _NSAppleEventManagerGenericHandler + 80 36 AE 0x7ff80e0e4e95 0x7ff80e0da000 + 44693 37 AE 0x7ff80e0e4723 0x7ff80e0da000 + 42787 38 AE 0x7ff80e0de028 aeProcessAppleEvent + 409 39 HIToolbox 0x7ff81217b836 AEProcessAppleEvent + 55 40 AppKit 0x7ff80a39ee6a _DPSNextEvent + 1725 41 AppKit 0x7ff80adf38b8 -[NSApplication(NSEventRouting) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 1290 42 AppKit 0x7ff80a38faa9 -[NSApplication run] + 610 43 AppKit 0x7ff80a362d34 NSApplicationMain + 823 44 SwiftUI 0x7ff9177a7da1 0x7ff91776f000 + 232865 45 SwiftUI 0x7ff917af0d40 0x7ff91776f000 + 3677504 46 SwiftUI 0x7ff917d8fef8 0x7ff91776f000 + 6426360 47 Crescendo CryptoTokenKit 0x10b1baf6e static HostApp.$main() + 30 48 Crescendo CryptoTokenKit 0x10b1bd2f9 main + 9 (HostApp.swift:24) 49 dyld 0x7ff8065c82cd start + 1805